On July 3, 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry introduced the popularity of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) authorities, representing the end result of Russia’s latest overtures towards the Taliban. This adopted the choice to improve diplomatic ties and formally accredit the Taliban’s new ambassador, Gul Hassan, to Moscow. Now that the IEA flag is flying over the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, questions stay in regards to the rationale behind Russia’s option to legitimise the Taliban regime.
A change, twenty years later
Moscow’s eagerness to domesticate diplomatic relations with the Taliban authorities stands in stark distinction to Russia’s strategy to the IEA’s first iteration from 1996 to 2001. At that point, the Taliban had been seen as hostile in direction of Russia. Moscow didn’t acknowledge their authorities and was compelled to wind down its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan in 1997. Further, Russia supplied navy help to the Northern Alliance and helped its Central Asian allies stabilise the scenario alongside the Afghan border towards the terrorist risk.
Complicating issues additional, the Taliban, in 2000, recognised the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as an unbiased state and urged the Muslim world to declare a holy battle on Russia to drive it to cease its counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya. With an estimated 2,500 Chechen militants present process coaching in Taliban-controlled territories, Moscow thought-about launching “preventive strikes” on terrorist camps in Afghanistan.
In this context, it was unsurprising that Russia joined forces with the United States to undertake the United Nations’ sanctions towards the Taliban and supplied logistical help to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which was launched after 9/11. In 2003, the Taliban had been included within the Russian record of terrorist organisations.
As the worldwide counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan reached an deadlock and the U.S. started to contemplate withdrawal, Moscow established unofficial contacts with the Taliban by its nearer engagement with Pakistan within the early 2010s. This enabled Russia to guard its safety pursuits in Afghanistan (with a deal with guaranteeing the protection of Russian residents), collaborating towards the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-Ok) and combating drug trafficking.
Additionally, in a stability act between the Afghan authorities and the Taliban, Russia stepped up its diplomatic efforts to place itself as a venue for resolving the Afghan disaster. Despite being blacklisted by the UN and outlawed in Russia, the Taliban representatives had been invited to take part within the Moscow Format and intra-Afghan conferences, as Russia tried to extend its personal regional affect and edge the U.S. out from Afghanistan.
With the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, whilst many different nations evacuated diplomatic personnel amid the lingering turmoil, the Russian Embassy in Kabul remained in operation — Moscow remained assured that the Taliban are able to placing issues in good order. Despite Russia’s good rapport with the Taliban’s dispensation, the persistent instability in Afghanistan has severely compromised its safety pursuits, with terrorist assaults towards the Russian Embassy in Kabul in September 2022 and the Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March 2024, purportedly carried out by the IS-Ok. There has been no significant progress within the financial initiatives both, although the Russian authorities proceed to harbour hopes that Afghanistan will emerge as a conduit for Russian exports to South and Southeast Asia.
The foundation
Russia’s official recognition of the IEA authorities displays Moscow’s conviction that the Taliban are “an objective reality” and the one political drive able to controlling energy in Afghanistan. This is additional strengthened by the notion of the Taliban as Russia’s “allies in countering terrorism”, which seemingly laid the muse for his or her de-itemizing in April 2025. It needs to be famous although that the Russian Supreme Court solely suspended the ban on the Taliban actions, and the grouping remains to be on the Russian unified federal record of terrorist organisations. This means that the Russian safety equipment shouldn’t be totally satisfied by the Taliban’s monitor report in combating terrorism, leaving scope to reverse the choice if the alliance with the Taliban proves to be a false daybreak.
The IEA’s recognition is a symbolic gesture that doesn’t deliver Russia any speedy advantages and doesn’t assure any improve to Moscow’s place in Afghanistan or the broader area. While some Russian officers are insisting on supporting the Taliban, together with “arming them”, it stays to be seen how far Moscow is keen to go and whether or not the joint combat towards the IS-Ok will yield tangible outcomes.
As Russia has set a precedent by recognising the IEA, some Central Asian states and even China could effectively observe swimsuit, particularly on condition that the Taliban’s expectations of their companions will definitely improve. Moscow’s free go to the Taliban concerning the inclusivity of their authorities, in addition to ladies’s and minority rights, could change into a brand new template for different regional gamers who will prioritise pragmatism over worth-primarily based strategy.
Ties with India
India will unlikely be significantly affected by the Russian transfer. New Delhi has fostered its personal incremental enchancment in diplomatic ties with the Taliban, having lately discovered widespread floor with them on the problem of terrorism in Kashmir. It is probably going that New Delhi will sustain diplomatic communications, commerce and humanitarian cooperation with the IEA, with out deviating from its stance on the legitimacy subject. Engagement with out formal recognition nonetheless appears to be the possible trajectory of India’s Afghanistan coverage.
Harsh V. Pant is Vice President, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Aleksei Zakharov is Fellow, Eurasia, Observer Research Foundation
